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V.—DISCUSSIONS.
THOUGHT AND ITS FUNCTION.
In a discriminative and courteous review of Pragmatism and Its
Critics (MOID, N.8., 80) Mr. Murray finds the theory of know-
ledge there set forth more " sublimely audacious " than convincing.
Its " audacity " oonsists, according to Mr. Murray, in attempts (1)
to exclude representation from the process of knowledge; (2) to
eliminate or ignore the distinction between the physio al and the
psychical; (3) to get rid of " the transoendent element in know-
ledge". Each of these points, of course, involves the others,
the last especially being at the bottom of the other two.
Looking up the passages in the volume under review, in which
the " representative " theory of knowledge is discussed, they seem
to be, so far as I have found, to the effect that thought is not
" merely," or " only," nor " primarily " representative; that what-
ever representative character thought has, is but a part of the
technique of its general function, which is to help to maintain or
alter or develop experiences of direct and immediate value.
There is an elimination of the representative character of thought
in the "mirroring," "photographic" sense in which Mr. Murray
takes it. Of this more farther on. But if representation be
taken in the sense of "pointing at," "leading to," and if it be con-
ceded that this "pointing" and "leading" constitutes an altera-
tion of the previous status of the things oonoerned, there is, as
doubtless Mr. Murray would ooncede, no elimination of repre-
sentation.
On the second count it must also be confessed that then is
an elimination of the kind of distinction between the physical and
the psyohical whioh Mr. Murray makes. Mr. Murray finds
in the view he is criticising an attempt to establish a continuity
between thinking and such activities as "reaching," "biting," etc.,
whioh he thinks amounts to a reduction of thought to physical
terms (p. 569). Here Mr. Murray obviously assumes that
thought is purely " psyohical" and that " reaching " and " biting "
are purely " physical". But the rejection of precisely this
assumption is a fundamental position of the standpoint whioh
Mr. Murray is criticising. It equally rejects the idealist reduction
of such actions as reaching, etc, to " psychical matters of fact".
For Pragmatism, the problem of knowledge is oonoerned primarily
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234 ADDISON W. MOOBE :
—not with the relation between the two metaphysical worlds of the
physical and the psychical, but with the relation between im-
mediately experienced things and values and the reconstruction
of these through reflexion. These directly experienced things
and values are aa little purely "physical" as thought Is\purely
"psychical ".1
Facing the issue squarely, would Mr Murray be willing to
describe reaching, biting, etc., as "purely physical"? May not
such activities, from a certain standpoint, be interpreted as just as
much "psychical," if not in the same way, as thought? On the
other hand, is thought in its first intention (i.e., as a way of
dealing with things, not thought dealing with thought) experienced
as something purely psychical? If the reply be that neither
reaching nor thought can be described at all except in a
psychological reflexion, still we shall find in this appeal to
psychology little support for a metaphysical distinction between
physical and psychical. For a psychological statement of reach-
ing includes such terms as sensation, impulse, pleasure and
pain, just as its account of thought includes " motor strains,"
"localisation," etc. Meanwhile, if we insist on equating thought
with "the psychical,'' and such experiences as reaching with
"the physical," how are we to escape "the old and tiresome
epistemological problem," the futility of which Mr. Murray seems
at times fully to appreciate (pp. 567-568) ?
" If a physical metaphor for thought must be used," says Mr.
Murray, " it resembles much more the relation between a camera
and the scene it photographs than the relation between stimulus
and response." It is difficult to read such passages as this and
avoid the conviction that at the bottom of much realistic criticism
of Pragmatism is not only a psycho-physical, but a visio-spatial
epistemology. Perhaps one of the simplest ways of meeting this
is to substitute a case of visionless judgment. Suppose, in an
instance where there has never been vision, an odour "means,''
" points," "leads" to experiences of touch, taste, etc, called
" orange ". How appropriate is the mirror-photograph metaphor
here ? Does the odour photograph the taste ?
On the question of the kind of change effected by thought, Mr.
Murray says (p. 569): " To know is as distinct from changing as
reaching is from biting ". Enormously more so, it should be said,
if knowing is purely " psychical," and reaching is purely " physical ".
On the other hand, if such a statement intends to concede that
there is as much continuity and likeness between thought and
change as between reaching and biting, any Pragmatist ought to be
t i f i l
1
 Tke Definition of tht Ptychical, by my colleague Prof. G. H.
Mead, in the decennial publications of the University of Chicago, will be
found very relevant and illuminating to the entire current diucossion—
especially to the issue between realist! and anti-realist*.
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THOUGHT AND ITS FUNCTION. 235
Continuing the subject of change Mr. MM ray says: "The
judgment, 'there is a sandwich on the sideboard,' prescinds in
intention, being interpreted as making any change in the sand-
wich ". Does it so "prescind," any more than does reaching
for it or biting it ? Doubtless any process of change requires
resistance and continuity (in this sense identity) in its material.
There obviously could be no change if any change whatever
meant annihilation or complete transformation of the material
involved. Would Mr. Murray concede that identity is con-
sisteut with some change ? If so, is not such identity all that
judgment, or any other act, requires9 Why should thought
demand any more rigid identity in its material than reaching
does in the thing reached for?
However, when it is said: " thought makes no change in the
material undergoing judgment," perhaps what is meant is that
any specific judgment doesn't change its own meaning, that is,
its own act; just as reaching or pulling, while producing changes,
are not at the same time something else, though obviously these
also run their course and lead into something else. If this be
what is meant, I cheerfully subscribe. But this is far from saying
that thought effects no change in the things thought of. Doubtless
also, the change which thought makes, and intends to make,
precludes in intention any other changes that would interfere vnth
the change it u making, just as reaching precludes in intention
other changes that would make reaching impossible.
Mr. Murray's attempt (p. 570) at a reductio ad absurdum of
the view that thought effects alteration in things, again rests
upon the assumption that the change which thought makes in
things must be identical with the changes involved in thought
itself as it goes on. But this hardly follows. Whether an
object is judged to be a wax figure or my friend Smith,
using Mr. Murray's illustration, may well make a difference
to the object as well as to the one judging, without the difference
being that of changing from wax to Smith or from Smith to wax.
If when I tell Smith he is a hero, Smith grows red, and when
I tell him he is a coward he becomes white, are we to say that
the change from red to white is identical with the difference
between the words "hero" and "coward"? I am of course
aware that all this assumption of continuity between thought
and snob, actions as reaching, speaking, etc., is precisely one
of the points challenged by the reviewer. But that challenge, aa
I have already pointed out, rests upon the conception of reaching,
etc., as purely " physical" and thought as purely " psychical"—a
conception which pragmatism utterly rejects.
After finding most of the review, and indeed the immediately pre-
ceding paragraph, devoted to a refutation of the position that know-
ledge is a real alternative interaction between beings, " a form of
stimulus and response," etc., one is a little surprised, not to say
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amazed, to see the last page of the review open with the state-
ment : " The Chicago Pragmatists have been accused of solipsism
because they have thus sought to eliminate the transcendent
element in knowledge and to explain the connective function
entirely in terms of the knower's experience" (italics mine).
Probably the term "because" and " thus" in this statement
are meant to refer only to the supposed elimination of trans-
cendence in general. But if " thus" refers to the way in
which " The Chicago Pragmatists " have eliminated transcendence
it is diffioult to see how they are to be accused of solipsism
"because" they have " thus" eliminated transcendence; "thus,"
i.e. by making thought a faotor in real alternative (even " physical "
according to Mr. Murray) aotivity. " Materialism " instead of
" solipsism " would be n. charge muoh more in accord with the
reviewer's previous oritioism of pragmatism, though equally far
from the fact.
The Pragmatist's appeal to the social oharaoter of immediate
unreflective experience the reviewer thinks is " sheer paralogism " ;
the paralogism being that it begs the whole problem of knowledge.
" The repeated disclaimer, we do not believe in a private conscious-
ness," says Mr. Murray, "can hardly be accepted as an a priori
solution of the problem of knowledge." Again, and finally: "In-
asmuch as it is possible actually to doubt whether experiences
other than my own exist, the logician must show how he arrives at
his disbelief iu the privacy of consciousness " (p. 570).
When a discussion reaches the point where each side accuses
the other of begging, this indicates that there is disagreement about
what the problem really is, and this means in turn that there is
disagreement about the data, the "matters of fact". And such is
dearly the case here. No Pragmatist finds it any more possible
"actually to doubt" the existence of other beings than himself
than to doubt his own existence. And if the test of " actually "
has some connexion with conduct, he is hard of faith regarding
the " aotuality " of this doubt in others—except possibly in patho-
logical cases. In the history of philosophy, this doubt is never
the starting point of reflexion. It is a methodological assumption
in reflexion; and judging from results, not a very successful one.
Its chief function seems to have been to keep " the old and tire-
some epistemological problem " going. Assume, with Descartes,
such a doubt, can "the logician," in Mr. Murray's terms, cure it?
The record of the attempts does not appear very encouraging.
Witness the " logic " of Descartes' attempt in his Third Medita-
tion, and the "logic" of the various subsequent solutions via pre-
established harmony. What more eloquent testimony to the utter
futility of trying to deduce existence of other beings from one's
own existence as the sole datum V And note that there can be no
appeal here to induction, as against pure deduction; for by the
assumption no fresh data can come in. Hence the begging to
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THOUGHT AND ITS FUNCTION. 237
which " the logician " is inevitably forced in his solutions, hence
the well-worn saws: " the only escape from solipsism is not to
get into i t " ; " at the entrance to the cave of Solipsism all
tracks point one way," etc. Hence also the Pragmatist'a refusal to
accept a statement of the problem of knowledge as one which starts
with " my own existence " as the sole datum. In a sense this does
"beg". It "begs" to be excused from embarking on an episte-
mological enterprise foredoomed to failure. But it does not beg
in the sense that it first agrees that the problem of knowledge is
the problem of solipsism and then begs it in the process of
solution. It is precisely because he sees that if he did so state
the problem of knowledge, he would as a " logician " have to beg
the solution that the Pragmatist refused to start with solipsistic
statement of the problem. And if by an "apriori solution " we
should mean a " solution" by conceptions which steer clear of
insoluble difficulties and which are " workable" in science and
social intercourse, this "solution " might even be rather a priori.
In view of this interpretation of the difficulties Mr. Murray has
encountered in my book, I fear that it neither olaims nor possesses
the " sublime audacity " which he has ascribed to it.
The apparent inconsistency, to which Mr. Murray calls attention
(pp. 80, 81), of the volume reviewed, is due to bad proof-reading
which failed to delete the prefix " in " before the word " significant".
ADDIBON W. MOORE.
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